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The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited.
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed'
list should contact the Editor.

Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights
and Environmental Ethics
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 1982
pp. 249, $18.95
This collection of essays is an
important sequel to the work of
another philosopher, Peter Singer,
whose Animal Liberation - A New Eth
ics for Our Treatment of Animals,
(Avon Books, 1975) has been widely
quoted by those who would emancipate
animals.
I n Animal Liberation the
central thesis is that animals have
moral standing, deriving from undeni
able, empirical evidence that they are
sentient individuals, sharing with man
the capacity to experience pain and
pleasure, and whose interests in terms
of needs, desires, purposes, goals,
and so on, ought therefore to be
given equal consideration with the Ii ke
interests of humans. By arguing for
equal consideration of interests as
between humans and other animal
species, Singer unwittingly set the
stage for what has since become a
widely based campaign to secu re for
animals a benefit that has hitherto
been considered the exclusive pre
serve of humans: recognition of the
right to be treated in accordance with
universally
accepted
principles
of
morality and justice, a right that
would be legally enforceable in the
cou rts.
There can be no question
that if this campaign succeeds, it

could usher in fundamental changes in
human customs and attitudes toward
various classes of animals: those used
for food, in experimentation, in the
manufacture of clothing and cosmetics,
for sport, and in many other ways.
I n All That Dwell Therein, Regan
goes further than Singer. Firstly, he
invokes the idea that all or some ani
mals may indeed qualify as rights
holders, something which Singer ref
uses to do, since "that wou Id be mak
ing a concession to popular moral
rhetoric" .
Secondly, he proposes a
generalized theory of rights which is
based not on Singer's equal consider
ation of interests principle, nor on
sentience, which other philosophers
have cited in arguing the case for
rights, but rather on the view that
the most reasonable criterion of rights
possession is what he calls the cri
terion of inherent value.
By this is
meant that the individual in question,
whether human or non-human, is not
only a living being but is also the
subject of a life that is better or
worse for him (her), independently of
whether anyone else finds his (her)
life useful, or to put it in the lan
guage of the philosopher, "of a life
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which is logically independent of any
other being's taking an interest in
it. "
Uncompelling as this may seem at
the outset, it proves to be a recu r
ring theme in more than half of the
essays, which, as we are told in the
Preface, consist of "papers and lec
tu res written and delivered over the
past six yea rs or so on the general
topic of human obligations to non-hu
mans.
The non-humans at issue
include not only non-human animals,
though our obligations to animals, and
their rights against us, are major
themes in most of the essays; also at
issue is the question of the founda
tions of ou r moral relations to natu re
generally .
This latter question
comes into full flower in the last three
essays, but it is a question that is
growing just beneath the surface
th roughout" .
To those readers who have thought
at length about the rights issue, it
will come as no surprise to learn that
if rights are to be ascribed to ani
mals, that is, to some or all living
animals ranging in size from the great
whales to amoebas, irrespective of the
inter- and intra-species differences in
intelligence, physiology, behavior and
communication capacities that they may
or may not exhibit, the definitive
solution to the question may ultimately
be grounded in the wider context of
envi ronmental ethics.
The very title
of this book indicates that it is not
only animals, collectively and individ
ually (including Homo ~apiens) on
which attention is being focused, but
also the rights of present and future
generations to the enjoyment of satis
factory places of habitation. Thus, it
is mankind's moral obligation to pro
tect, or at the very least, not to
harm, the biocoenosis or biosphere as
a whole: the land, the water and the
air and all who live there and depend
on it for their continued sustenance
and existence, that is the underlying
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issue of this book.
Given the theory that the criterion
of inherent worth is the most reason
able criterion of rights possession, it
is logical to ask "Can the concept of
inherent value be applied to inanimate
natu re?", more particularly in light of
the explanatory passages contained in
essays 3, 4, and 6, where "inherent
value" is used specifically in reference
to animate individuals.
I n essays 8
and 9, however,- which are titled
respectively "What Sorts of Bei ngs
Can Have Rights?" and "The Nature
and Possibility of an Environmental
Ethic", the author makes some initial,
halting, steps toward establishing that
"a genuine ethic of the environment,
distinct from a 'management ethic',
which views the natural order as a
system of 'resources' calling for 'wise
management', and from a 'kinship eth
ic', which widens the scope of those
meriting direct
moral
concern
to
include sentient non-humans" could be
rooted in such a value.
Here he
examines and finds wanting, argu
ments advanced by those who chal
lenge the view that "non-conscious
non-sentient objects (such as trees,
flowers and even rivers) have a good
or value of their own", and sketches
in outline the essentials of an ethic
that would recognize the independent
value of both the fauna and the flora
of the natural order.
In so doing, he
draws attention to the manifest inade
quacy of the traditional notions of
cruelty and kindness, previously dis
cussed in essays 3 ("Animal Experi
mentation:
First
Thoughts"),
4
("Animal Rights, Human Wrongs") and
5 ("Why Whaling is Wrong") as means
of preventing or alleviating suffering
inflicted by humans, and helps pre
pa re the way for the development of a
"deep ecology" rather than a "shallow
envi ronmentalism" view of ou r obliga
tions to the natu ral world.
These
ideas are more fully developed in the
final essay, which examines the ear'ly
history and possible motivations of the
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North
American
I ndian
peoples'
involvement in the fur trade, when
fur-bearing animals as well as buffalo
were systematically overkilled, even to
the point of rendering local popula
populations of the animals extinct.
No review of these essays would be
complete if it failed to draw attention
to the emphasis which is placed by
Regan on our moral obligation to be
vegetarians. In the first essay ("The
Moral Basis. of Vegetarianism")
he
argues that the right to life and the
moral right not to be caused gratui
gratuitous suffering "are possessed by the
animals we eat if they are possessed
by the humans we do not".
After
examining the manner in which animals
are raised and killed under modern
factory farming conditions, he points
out that almost everyone who buys
meat at a typical supermarket or res
restaurant is causally implicated in a
practice which causes pain that is
both "non-trivial and undeserved" for
the animals in question.
But as he
shows later in the essay, it is the
killing of animals, and not just their
pain, that matters morally.
Regan argues that just as we are
all rationally entitled to demand that
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those who are implicated In a practice
that causes non-trivial, undeserved
pain to human beings must show how
it is that the practice, and their role
in it, is not immoral, so also is the
vegetarian in a position where he can
rationally demand that those who lead
a life contrary to his show how it is
that their way of life can be morally
justified.
Nevertheless, he does not
claim that all practices that involve
the killing of animals for food cannot
possibly be justified. The situation of
the Eskimo (Inuit) is cited as one
instance in which this could be so.
I n bringing before the public a
collection of writings by one of the
foremost thinkers in this domain, All
That Dwell Therein has much to offer
all those readers whose interests,
concerns, occupations, and academic
or professional affiliations cause them
to ponder the true natu re of man's
ethical obligations to non-human life
and the environment.
More particu
particularly, it should be of interest to leg
legislators, educators and others who
may be in a position to influence the
course of our moral and cultural evo
evolution.

Peter J. Hyde

